A monopolist bookmaker may set betting odds on a fairly even contest to induce matchfixing by an influential corrupt punter. His loss to the corrupt punter is more than made up for by enticing enough ordinary punters to bet on the losing team. This result is in sharp contrast to competitive bookmaking, where even contests have been shown to be immune to fixing.
Introduction
Match-fixing and betting related corruption seem widespread if one goes by media headlines, and legal scholars are beginning to pay attention. 1 Yet formal research on this issue is relatively lacking. 2 If a small group of bettors with financial muscles, to be referred as the influential punter (in short, IP or fixer), can access player(s) who, by underperforming, can tilt the outcome of a sports contest that has high visibility and on which many people bet, the competitive show is hit at its foundation.
In an earlier work (Bag and Saha, 2011), we presented a formal model of match-fixing in the context of a (Bertrand) competitive fixed odds betting market. There the bookmakers' desire to steal business by undercutting rivals' odds exposes the contest to fixing, whereby a favorite deliberately underperforms. Such destructive effects of competition are felt mostly in uneven contests; even contests are generally safe. One question then is what happens if a bookmaker has market power. Will he try to protect the market and his profit from the corrupt punter? Or, will he abuse his power to steer the market in the direction of odds rigging? We address this question here, by restricting our attention mainly to even or near-even contests.
In our model a monopolist bookmaker posts betting odds, or equivalently sets the 'prices' of bets, for a contest between two teams to attract bets from a mass of ordinary bettors. An anonymous influential punter may be able to bribe some members of one of the teams to underperform, and then place a large sum of bets on the other team. Such possibilities as well as the ordinary bettors' response are factored in by the bookie, at the time of posting the odds.
Bettors' responses (including IP's) depend on their position in the information hierarchy. We assume that the ordinary bettors have exogenous and heterogenous beliefs and are unaware of the risk of match-fixing. So they respond to market prices naively. The bookie and the IP, on the other hand, have superior information; they both know the teams' true win probabilities. Further, the IP can rise to the top of the information hierarchy, if he can fix the match.
Aware of the fact that IP will never have less information than him, the bookie cannot expect to make profit from the IP. But he needs to be mindful of how IP's incentives will be affected by the prices he will set. If the prices are so high that IP's betting becomes unprofitable despite match-fixing, the integrity of the contest will be protected, but only after sacrificing a sizeable 1 See an edited volume (Haberfeld and Sheehan, 2013) titled, Match-Fixing in International Sports: Existing Processes, Law Enforcement, and Prevention Strategies.
Betting related match-fixing makes frequent headlines. Latest is the allegation of an entire soccer league being fixed in Canada ("Revealed: Entire 'rogue league corrupted by match-fixing'" -October 14, 2015 news at The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/11932437/Revealed-Entire-rogue-league-corrupted-by-matchfixing.html). The high profile Indian Premier League (or IPL) in which many top international cricketers participate was rocked by betting and fixing allegations in the recent past -see the report "Fixing? It's people like us doing it" on May 22, 2013 at http://www.espncricinfo.com/magazine/content/story/637034.html. For fixing allegations in other sports including soccer in Europe, ATP tennis tournaments, basketball, horse races etc., see links to various news reports in Bag and Saha (2011) . 2 There are some empirical papers on sports corruption. Duggan and Levitt (2002) study corruption in Sumo wrestling but not betting. Strumpf (2003) , Wolfers (2006) , Winter and Kukuk (2008) etc. study betting-related corruption in sports. See also two very recent contributions on detecting match-fixing -De Muinck and Quatacker (2013) for soccer, and Rodenberg and Feustel (2014) for tennis. chunk of the ordinary bettors' market. On the other hand, if the prices are set appropriately low, IP can find match-fixing profitable; if he gets to bribe one team, his return from the bet on the other team will be large enough to cover the cost of bribery. In this case, the bookie faces a clear loss to IP, but the loss may be partially (if not fully) offset by attracting a significant number of ordinary bettors. So his profits from these two alternative price regimes can go either way. Since which price regime is his own choice, the question is whether he would go for the first regime, which we call bribe prevention or the second regime, which we call bribe inducement. In contests where teams are (near) evenly matched, which regime would he choose?
When only one team is corruptible, we find that he would choose bribe inducement for any positive chance of secret liaison with the corruptible team (given some standard assumptions). 3 This is because bribe prevention is too costly; it requires giving up too much on the ordinary punters' betting. In some extreme instances, when the probability of accessing the corrupt team is very high, the bookie actually welcomes the fixing role of the IP. With his tacit help he can drastically increase the losing chance of the corrupt team and steer most of the ordinary bettors to bet on it. Here, the loss to the IP is much smaller than the substantial gain of capturing (nearly) the whole of the unsuspecting bettors' market.
Surprisingly though, this perverse incentive loses its force when both teams are corruptible.
In that case, though match-fixing opportunities are greater, the bookie is unsure of which team the IP will be able to bribe, and therefore, he needs to make concession on the bet prices of both teams, which means yielding a much greater loss to not only IP but also a section of ordinary bettors; lowering both prices does not help to tilt the market in one way or other. Therefore, bribe inducement will be preferred less frequently.
The finding of the monopoly setup is in sharp contrast to the competitive case analyzed in Bag and Saha (2011) , where even contests are generally immune. Either the competitive prices are above the bribery threshold level, or the bookmakers (non-cooperatively) coordinate on the threshold prices for fear of letting the IP in. Under monopoly, despite his full market power, the bookie may not try to protect the market. The underlying market microstructure of our model assumes that the median bettor always believes the contest to be dead even. So when the contest is truly an even (or a near even) contest, the bookie's informational superiority disappears, and his expected profit will be minimum. In such cases, an anonymous fixer can come handy to make the contest lop-sided and in anticipation of that the bookie can induce the ordinary bettors en masse to back the losing team. But whether this will be optimal depends on how large is the expected cost of fixing, which can significantly vary depending on whether one team or both teams are corruptible.
Though our main analysis is presented assuming 'uniform' distribution of the ordinary bettors' beliefs, we show that our key insight that the bookie will be most keen to orchestrate match-fixing in even or near even contests will hold under general (but symmetric) belief distributions. However, the other assumptions regarding the bettors, such as their exogenous beliefs and their naivety of not suspecting foul play, are important. That bettors have diverse beliefs and less precise information than the bookie are somewhat essential to organize betting. 4 There is also considerable evidence on leisure betting, which is most likely to be based on naive beliefs (Saunders and Turner, 1987; Bruce and Johnson, 1992; Winter and Kukuk, 2008) . But if we allow the bettors to be suspicious of match-fixing, when they see the posted odds that are too good to be true (based on their initial beliefs), market manipulation will backfire; the bookie will be better off by driving the fixer out of the market. We accommodate this argument, albeit less formally; but the message is clear: the more unsuspecting the bettors are, the stronger the incentives to induce match-fixing.
At a theoretical level, our exercise is also useful for extending the literature from insider betting to fixing and betting. The insider betting model of Shin (1991) , from which we adapt the basic setup, is similar to insider trading (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Seyhun, 1992) , where some agents use privileged information which might have been randomly or costlessly acquired.
Match-fixing on the other hand is about generating privileged information at a positive cost and then using it. 5 This is also related to the idea of market manipulation in finance where even an uninformed trader may buy a stock to bid up its price with the intent of selling the stock at a later date and profit from it (e.g., Allen and Gorton, 1992; Chakraborty and Yilmaz, 2004) . Further, our study provides insights into the extent by which sabotages can be controlled through market prices -a relatively neglected issue so far in the industrial organization research.
From an empirical point of view, we question a common perception of the bookmakers as victims of match-fixing. 6 We argue that in many plausible scenarios they may indirectly benefit from match-fixing. Should the authority go after only the fixer, or the bookmaker as well? When the bookmaker is merely trying to avoid losses he cannot be blamed; but when he profits from fixing, he should be held culpable. 7 We acknowledge that the insights from our model should not be directly applied to parimutuel betting markets. Such markets are differently organized and the bookmaker's role is different with very little power in setting market odds, as analyzed in a number of works by Ottaviani and Sorensen (2005; 2009; 2010) . Fixed odds are practised by bookmakers in the UK and Europe, e.g., ChoiceOdds, Ladbrokes, Paddy Power, and William Hill.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and an analysis of betting and bribery decisions. Sections 3 and 4 contain the main results, with some related examples and simulations appearing in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 extend the earlier analysis to more general environments, followed by conclusions in Section 8. The formal proofs appear in the Appendix.
The Model
The setup is similar to that of Bag and Saha (2011) , which in turn draws upon Shin (1991) . A monopolist bookmaker, the bookie, sets the odds on each of two teams winning a sports match (i.e. sets the prices of two tickets); the match being drawn is not a possibility. Ticket i with price π i yields a dollar if team i wins and yields nothing if team i loses. There are a continuum of naive punters, parameterized by individual and exogenous belief, the probability q, that team 1 will win; q is distributed 'uniformly' over (0, 1).
The assumption of uniform distribution is justified on the ground of the bettors having well spread-out beliefs. However, later with a general distribution function of beliefs we show that our key results are likely to hold, if the distribution is continuous and symmetric with mean 1/2.
Bettors' beliefs are not only exogenous and unrelated to the nature's draw of a team's win probability, but also naive in the sense that bettors are unaware of the risk of match-fixing. Later we relax the naivety assumption and show how the results might change if the bettors are 'rational'.
In the absence of any external influence, the probability that team i will win is 0 < p i < 1. External influence is exerted through bribery of a (few) corruptible (members of a) team to underperform. If team i is bribed, its probability of winning is secretly lowered from p i to λ i p i (0 ≤ λ i < 1). We assume λ i to be exogenous. 8 We assume the bookmaker to be honest. There is an anonymous influential punter, IP, who may bribe a team and bet against it. He can access team i with probability 0 ≤ µ i ≤ 1. Note that the probabilistic access makes the prospect of match-fixing uncertain, even when λ i = 0.
The bookie, IP, and the team players -all initially observe the draw p 1 . The law enforcement authority investigates the losing team i with an exogenous probability 0 < α i < 1. 9 On conviction, the corrupt players are fined f in total and the match-fixer f I .
The distribution of the ordinary bettors' wealth is 'uniform' over [0, 1], with 1 dollar each and a collective wealth of y dollars. The wealth of IP is z = 1 − y dollars. All agents are risk-neutral. Player incentives for bribe-taking and sabotage. Suppose a corrupt player (or a group of corrupt players) of team i is contacted by IP with probability µ i and a deal is struck, by which the corrupt 8 The team may have honest players who cannot be bribed, and therefore, λ i = 0 is not appropriate in a team game. One can make λ i sensitive to bribe at the cost of some complexity. 9 It does not employ sophisticated game-theoretic inferences about match-fixing by observing π i or p i .
Betting and bribe-taking
player is promised a bribe b i to underperform. The bribe will be paid only if the team loses. In the event team i wins, regardless of the player's underperformance the bribe money is not paid; the corrupt player in that case collects only the team reward w.
Given any belief p i and α i , a bribe deal involving b i is accepted and honored by the corrupt player, if the expected payoff from underperformance is at least as great as the expected payoff from honest performance. That is to say, the deal is struck if and only if
i.e., if and only if
The inequality (1) makes underperformance incentive compatible and the agreement self-enforcing. 10 The minimum bribe required to entice underperformance is b i = w + α i f. We assume that IP holds all the bargaining power so that b i = b i .
We should emphasize that if the players of two teams had different beliefs regarding the teams' chances (different from p 1 ), inequality (1) could be easily replicated for those beliefs, because
(1) corresponds to the players' beliefs, and the lower bound on b i is not sensitive to any belief. it should be obvious that IP will hold either superior or same information as the bookie. The bookie can thus never make positive expected profit from IP. In particular, when IP has superior information (on the fixing) the bookie's expected profit from IP will be negative.
This is a consequence of our assumption that IP has precise knowledge of p i (just like the bookie). Admittedly, this is a somewhat strong assumption, but it helps to underscore his role as a 10 The IP will honor his promise with the bribe, as is commonly assumed in corruption models. 11 The timing of IP's access to teams (after or before the odds are posted) is immaterial.
fixer. We make the bookie's choice difficult by introducing a certain cost through this assumption.
One can allow greater realism by making IP's information set coarse, which we do not study here.
Now, consider IP's incentives. Having learnt p i and observed π i (i = 1, 2), when p i ≤ π i for all i = 1, 2, the influential punter can profitably bet only if he succeeds in bribing one of the teams, because otherwise his expected gains from betting is zero. Further, to permit bribery of team i and betting on team j, it must be the case that 1 − λ i p i ≥ π j . That is, the eventual probability of team j winning must not fall below π j . Assuming that is the case, his expected profit from bribing
where
Clearly, for EΠ I to be positive π j must be smaller than φ i . By corollary then IP is prevented from bribing team i if π j > φ i . In the event of π i = φ j , we make a tie-breaking rule to ensure that the bookie's optimal bribery program always has a solution.
Assumption 1 (Tie-breaking rule) If 'bribing and betting' and 'betting without bribing' yield zero expected profit, then IP will choose an option (including 'not betting at all') in accordance with the bookie's preference.
Given Assumption 1, if the bookie wishes to induce match-fixing of team i, he needs to set π j subject to the following constraint (along with setting π i ≥ p i for both teams):
What will be the IP's incentives, if p i > π i were set instead? In this instance, IP can make positive gains from 'honest' betting, and therefore there is an opportunity cost to fixing. φ i will no longer be the threshold price for π j . In Bag and Saha (2011) we have characterized these cases exhaustively. In this paper we restrict our attention only to the case where p i ≤ π i for both teams.
Setting both π 1 and π 2 below p 1 and p 2 , respectively, would imply money pump scenario. We impose the following (no) Dutch-book restriction to rule it out:
Assumption 2 The bookie must always choose prices 0 ≤ π 1 , π 2 ≤ 1 such that π 1 + π 2 ≥ 1.
3 Prevent, tolerate or encourage match-fixing?
Our main interest is to see whether the bookie would choose not to prevent match-fixing, and if so in which type of contests that is most likely to happen. To develop an early insight we first consider the benchmark case of 'honest' betting where match-fixing is not possible by assumption.
No IP scenario. Suppose there is no IP so that the teams' winning probabilities are maintained at (p 1 , p 2 ). Given Assumption 2, bettors with beliefs q ∈ [0, 1 − π 2 ] will buy ticket 2 and q ∈ [π 1 , 1]
will buy ticket 1; punters with q in(1 − π 2 , π 1 ) will buy neither. Thus the bookie's objective is:
The solution to this problem is π 0 1 = √ p 1 and π 0 2 = √ p 2 , resulting in expected profit: It is around the even contest the bookie would wish that p 1 were different from 1/2, say for example 1/8. Then the bookie's expected profit would rise from 0.17y to 0.42y. Indeed, the same gains in profit would be achieved, if the bookie could engage the IP for a fixed fee (not more than 0.25y) to bribe team 1 with probability 4/5 and reduce p 1 from 1/2 to 1/32. The ex-ante probability of team 1 winning would then be exactly 1/8. Of course, when the bookie has no link with IP, the only way he can engage the IP is by inducing him through market prices, which clearly will have to be distorted from what is shown in Fig. 1 . Nevertheless, the intuition is that the monopolist's incentive to manipulate the market is the strongest around the even contest.
This observation is, of course, made on the basis of the uniform distribution of bettors' (naive) beliefs with mean 1/2. That being the case, the intuition is likely to be more general. We show later on with a general distribution function that as long as it is symmetric with mean 1/2, even contests are likely to be rife for fixing. However, if the mean belief diverges from 1/2, the minimum profit point will also diverge from 1/2, but probably not stray too far from 1/2. For the uniform distribution, the minimum profit point will be between the mean belief and 1/2. We show this in Section 6. The main point is that the minimum profit point will be fairly close to the dead even contest, and hence the bookie's incentive to induce fixing will also be stronger here.
Bribe prevention program. We now return to our game Γ , and first analyze the bookie's bribe prevention strategy. Formally, the bookie solves the following bribe-prevention program:
subject to:
Lemma 1 (Optimal bribe prevention prices) If IP can potentially bribe team j to bet on team i, bribe prevention price of ticket i at any given p i , is
It is easy to verify that φ 2 is an increasing function of p 1 and it intersects the curve √ p 1 from above at a unique point. Let p 0 1 be this point of intersection. Clearly, at all p 1 < p 0 i the bribe prevention constraint binds on π 1 , implying that profit on ticket 1 will have to be sacrificed if bribery of team 2 is to be prevented. Likewise, φ 1 is downward sloping in p 1 like √ p 2 and φ 1 intersects √ p 2 from below. Let this intersection point be p 1 1 . That means, at all p 1 > p 1 1 the bribe prevention constraint binds on π 2 implying loss of profit from ticket 2, if bribery of team 1 is to be prevented. Combining these two observations the following can be stated. These two regimes have different implications for the bookie. When trying to prevent fixing is costly, he has a hard choice to make. If he chooses 'not to prevent', it should be seen as a 'loss minimizing' strategy in a corrupted environment over which he has no control. But when prevention of fixing is costless, he is certainly on a safer ground. But if he still chooses not to prevent fixing, it must be due to his intention to profit from the evil influence of the fixer. Though both decisions favor bribe inducement, and are based on similar profit comparisons, they are qualitatively different.
Lemma 2 (Costless or costly prevention of match-fixing)
To underscore their difference we will call the decision to induce bribery in the first scenario bribe tolerance and in the second scenario bribe encouragement. In the first case, there is very little sense to go after the bookie, while in the second case he can be held guilty of wrongdoing.
Bribe inducement: only one team corruptible.We will first analyze the case where only one team, namely team 1, is corruptible. That means, to induce bribery the bookie needs to set π 2 below the threshold level φ 1 as given by (2) . No such constraint will apply to the price of ticket 1, because team 2 is not corruptible. The formal statement of the bribe inducement (BI)
program is as follows:
ticket 2 profit
subject to
is the dampening impact of bribery on team 1's winning chances. Let us note that the solution to the BI problem is
where by setting 1 − p 1 λ * 1 + µ 1 (z/y)(1 − λ 1 p 1 ) = φ 1 , we obtaiñ
Even contests. While the above solution is given for any given p 1 , for the rest of this section we will concentrate on a specific value of p 1 , namely 1/2, for our suspicion that it is at and around the even contest the bookie's incentive to induce fixing is strongest. If we find bribe inducement optimal at p 1 = 1/2, then by continuity at all p 1 close to 1/2 also bribe inducement will be optimal.
Now we set out to compare the profit from bribe prevention with that from bribe inducement
. Given that only team 1 can be bribed, if 1/2 < p 1 1 then at p 1 = 1/2 bribe prevention is costless (relative to the benchmark case), and the bookie's profit will be
Alternatively, if p 1 1 < 1/2, then his bribe prevention profit will be lower:
Turning our attention to bribe inducement profit, we see from Eq. (6) that at any given p 1 , such as 1/2, the expected profit critically depends on the range of µ 1 , i.e. whether µ 1 falls in between or below/above the two critical values of µ 1 , namelyμ 1 and
, our assumption automatically holds, becauseμ 1 < 1. 12 We now write the bookie's profit function for bribe inducement for three ranges of µ 1 . 13 At each range of µ 1 total profit is broken into two terms, showing profit from each ticket, as follows:
From the above we can make the following observations.
At sufficiently small values of µ 1 , bribe inducement profit is arbitrarily close to the benchmark (i.e. no IP) profit. As µ 1 → 0, from (9) we see that
(so that EΠ BP < EΠ 0 ), then we can claim that at all sufficiently small values of µ 1 bribe inducement is optimal. This is our first result, and it does not depend on any additional assumptions.
The reason is that for a very small chance of bribery, prices do not need to be distorted much from their unconstrained levels in order to induce bribery. But to do the contrary, price of ticket 2 has to be discretely raised to φ 1 which forces a significant loss. Therefore, tolerating a small chance of match-fixing is preferable.
At moderate or higher values of µ 1 , the optimality of bribe inducement depends on how long EΠ BI continues to be greater than EΠ BP . If EΠ 1 BI , EΠ 2 BI and EΠ 3 BI were all declining in µ 1 , then the prediction is straightforward. After a critical value of µ 1 the cost of inducing bribery would be far greater than the cost of preventing bribery, and hence match-fixing will be prevented. Furthermore, EΠ BI will never exceed EΠ 0 , and hence bribe encouragement will never happen.
But if EΠ 2
BI and EΠ 3 BI are increasing in µ 1 then some interesting possibilities arise. In Fig. 2 we present this scenario. It is then possible that the whole profit curve EΠ BI can be above EΠ BP , which means that at all values of µ 1 bribe inducement is preferred (provided EΠ BP < EΠ 0 ). Indeed, sufficient conditions can be specified to ensure this possibility. A key requirement for this to happen is to make sure that EΠ 2 BI is increasing in µ 1 . It can be verified that as µ 1 → 0, EΠ 2 BI → EΠ BP . Further, imposing a positive slope condition on EΠ 2 BI ensures that EΠ BI would be above EΠ BP for at least up to µ 1 = within a critical range, which we denote by Σ 1 introduced in Definition 1 below (see Lemma A1 in Appendix for the derivation of Σ 1 ; some simulations are also included).
= 0 at two values of y, say y 0 and y 1 . 14 Then define Σ 1 to be the set of all y ∈ (y 0 , y 1 ), such that at all y ∈ Σ 1 we have J(y) > 0.
The condition says that y should not be too high or too small. The reason for this lies in the fact that the bookie must do a tricky balancing act if he were to induce bribery. On the one hand, he must reduce the price of ticket 1 to entice the naive punters to bet on team 1. Hence their wealth and consequently their wagers on team 1 should not be too small. However, higher y also releases some countervailing effect via ticket 2. As IP is to be conceded enough gains to finance his fixed cost of bribery, the price of ticket 2 must be so adjusted that iIf IP's wealth (z) falls, the price of ticket 2 must be lowered appropriately to enable him to generate the same surplus as before to cover the cost of bribery. Thus, lower z means lower π 2 (via lower φ 1 ), which in turn attracts many naive punters as well to bet on team 2 -something the bookie must try to avoid. Essentially, enabling the IP to fix the match creates a free riding opportunity for some ordinary bettors. Hence, z should not be too small, i.e. y should not be too high. We now state our first set of results. Proposition 1 (Inducing match-fixing) Consider even and near even contests, and suppose
, so that bribe prevention is costly.
(i) Then there is always a range of µ 1 starting from µ 1 = 0 where inducing match-fixing is optimal.
(ii) Suppose Assumption 3 holds. If y ∈ Σ 1 , inducing match-fixing will be optimal at all µ 1 ∈ (0, 1].
14 J(y) = 0 is quadratic in y (φ 1 is a function of z = 1 − y).
Thus, for the even and near-even contests match-fixing is very likely. While that could be due to the high cost of preventing match-fixing, our next result will show that the bookie may have good reasons to even encourage match-fixing, because EΠ BI can potentially exceed EΠ 0 at some high value of µ 1 , as shown in Fig. 2 . For this to happen we need two things: (i) EΠ 3 BI must be increasing in µ 1 , and (ii) EΠ 3 BI must exceed EΠ 0 at µ 1 sufficiently close to 1. It turns out that both requirements are met if we ensure EΠ 3 BI > EΠ 0 (as µ 1 → 1), which boils down to another critical range of y, denoted as Σ 2 . 15 See Appendix for some simulations of Σ 2 .
Since Σ 2 is defined in terms of EΠ 3 BI which presupposes λ < 1 2 , we need to consider λ ≥ 1/2 as well, in which case EΠ 2 BI applies to all µ 1 ≥μ 1 . There, we define the critical region of y in terms of the limiting value of EΠ 2 BI (exceeding EΠ 0 ) as Σ a 2 .
Definition 2 Define
(i) Suppose λ 1 < 1 2 , and let Σ 2 be the set of all y such that y[2
, and let Σ a 2 be the set of all y such that y[2
, then by definition EΠ BI > EΠ 0 as µ 1 → 1. Once again the critical range of y specifies the size of the ordinary punters' wealth to be neither too high nor too low. The explanation is same as before. If it is too high, match-fixing is potentially rewarding, but the scope of free riding (by some ordinary punters) is also great. But if it is too low, the potential gain from bribery is small. Now in Proposition 2 we claim that if y ∈ Σ 2 or Σ a 2 , then above a critical value of µ 1 , not only is bribe inducement optimal, but it is of the 'bribe encouragement' type.
Proposition 2 (Actively encourage bribery) Consider the even or a near-even contest and suppose Assumption 3 holds.Then there exists a critical value of µ 1 , say µ 0 1 ∈ (μ 1 , 1), such that at all µ 1 > µ 0 1 the expected profit from bribe inducement exceeds the expected profit of the 'no
It is notable that we have not insisted on p 1 1 < 1 2 and/or y ∈ Σ 1 in Proposition 2. While those assumptions along with the condition specified in Proposition 1 give rise to the graph we have presented in Fig. 2 , they are not necessary for bribe encouragement. As long as y ∈ Σ 2 , EΠ BI will cross EΠ 0 at some high µ 1 , and bribe encouragement will take place. So, Propositions 1 and 2 focus on two different aspects -general bribe inducement for unrestricted µ 1 (Proposition 1) vs. a specific type of bribe inducement for a smaller range of µ 1 (Proposition 2) -and it is not always possible to rank the corresponding y-value sets. Table 1 provides a comparison of results.
The main message of Propositions 1 and 2 is that when contests are close the bookmaker may prefer to orchestrate match-fixing (via market prices). Though in most cases, such orchestration is 15 Let µ 1 → 1 in EΠ BI and write the expression for EΠ BI − EΠ 0 > 0, which gives y[2
on the right-hand side to obtain L(y). 
Proposition 1
Proposition 2 Type of contests Even Even Bribe prevention Costly May or may not ( relative to the be costly benchmark case ) Bribe inducement is At all µ 1 At high values of µ 1 preferred Nature of bribe Bribe tolerance Bribe encouragement inducement highlighted The required range of y Relatively narrow Relatively wide
Both teams corruptible
When both teams are corruptible, how does the prospect of match-fixing change? We can see that the bookie now has a choice of targeting a specific team or either teams (to bribe). If a specific team is bribed, the analysis is similar to that of the previous section. 16 So we extend our analysis to bribery of either teams. Prima facie the scope for match-fixing increases under this option. But as the bookie does not know which team the IP might get access to, he will have to concede sufficient rents on either ticket. This makes bribe inducement quite costly and less often preferable.
To simplify the analysis, we impose symmetry: 0 < µ 1 = µ 2 = µ ≤ 1/2, λ 1 = λ 2 = λ ≥ 0, α 1 = α 2 = α and Ω 1 = Ω 2 = Ω. As before, we assume that at most one team can be accessed (with probability 2µ).
Even contests. We focus on p 1 = 1/2, and recall from Lemma 1 that the optimal bribe prevention prices are π i = max{ √ p i , φ j }. At p 1 = 1/2, if the price constraints don't bind (i.e 
For bribe inducement, we need to consider first the ex-ante probability of each team's win.
For team 1 it is r 1 = µ(λp 1 + (1 − λp 2 )) + (1 − 2µ)p 1 = p 1 + µ(1 − λ)(1 − 2p 1 ); for team 2 it is 16 There is one difference though. The team which is not targeted must be protected from bribery.
. Curiously, at p 1 = 1/2 we have r 1 = r 2 = 1/2. The prospect of bribing either team cancels out each other's gains in winning probability. However, an exact offset occurs only at p 1 = 1/2; at p 1 > 1/2, r 1 < p 1 and consequently r 2 > p 2 . So in general bribery of either team reduces the gap between the favorite and the longshot, making the contest more even.
If at the perfectly even contest the probability of win does not change with bribery, then what is the potential benefit of inducing bribery? The simple answer is: none, unless bribe prevention is costly. In other words, in this environment there is no hope for getting higher profit than the 'no IP' case. Bribe encouragement cannot occur here; at best there may be bribe tolerance.
The general statement of the bribe inducement problem is
The unconstrained solution is given by
At
2 , leading to profit
On the other hand, if the constraints bind the profit is restricted to be
Clearly, bribery is not preferred. Further, if bribe prevention is costless, i.e. EΠ BP = EΠ 0 , bribe inducement will be out of question. Therefore, the best prospect for bribe inducement arises when π i =π i < φ, in addition to EΠ BP < EΠ 0 and we would be looking for the scenario EΠ BP ≤ EΠ U BI < EΠ 0 . We find that the conditionπ < φ (at p 1 = 1/2) is satisfied if y belongs to a critical range, which we call Σ 3 . 17 In the Appendix we show through simulation that under suitable parameter specifications Σ 3 is nonempty (see Table 6 ). With higher µ and λ the set Σ 3 shrinks. Intuitively, the expected payout to IP increases with µ. So the bookie will try to optimize on this loss, by raising the unconstrained prices, but then the likelihood of the constraint binding also increases.
Assuming y ∈ Σ 3 , we are guaranteed to have unconstrained prices for the BI problem. Now we try to identify the values of µ at which we will get EΠ U BI > EΠ BP . We note that EΠ U BI is a decreasing function of µ, as
From Eq. (15) we also see that EΠ U BI approaches EΠ 0 when µ → 0, and thereby at all µ sufficiently small we must have EΠ U BI > EΠ BP . At the other end of µ, i.e. µ = 1/2, we impose EΠ U BI < EΠ BP with the help of the following assumption. Now we state the main result of this section.
Proposition 3 (More match-fixing possibilities imply less match-fixing) Suppose p 1 1 < 1 2 < p 0 1 (so that EΠ BP < EΠ 0 ), y ∈ Σ 3 (so that EΠ BI = EΠ U BI ), and Assumption 4 holds. Then at all even and near-even contests bribe inducement of either team is preferred to bribe prevention if µ is less than a critical valueμ < 1/2. For µ aboveμ match-fixing will be prevented. Bribery in the range µ ≤μ will be of the 'bribe tolerance' variety.
The message of Proposition 3 is strikingly different from that of Propositions 1 and 2. No longer does bribery yield higher profit than the 'no IP' case. So the bookie has no incentive to 'welcome' the IP. He can tolerate him but only up to a certain level of µ. The intuition is that, to induce bribery the bookie must incur losses to IP on both tickets. This loss steadily rises with µ outweighing the relative cost of bribe prevention, rendering bribe inducement quickly suboptimal.
It can also be shown that if λ is sufficiently small the EΠ U BI curve will be U-shaped and symmetric (against p 1 ), which will shift down with µ, as illustrated in Fig. 4 for an example. An implication is that even when the incentive to induce bribery disappears at the perfectly even contest, it may still persist at nearby contests. Example 2 in the next section makes this point sharper.
5 Examples and simulations Example 1. We present some simulations on the basis of an example assuming only team 1 is corruptible. Here, the entire range of p 1 is considered, though our main interest lies around p 1 = 1/2. As our simulations show, the theoretical results are generalizable to a large set of p 1 .
We set λ 1 = 0, w + α(f + f I ) = 0.05 and y = 0.8, which implies z = 0.2 and therefore Ω = 0.25.
Since λ = 0, φ 1 = φ 2 = 1/(1+Ω) = 0.8 at all p 1 ; we can also calculate the upper limit of y to be 0.88 that supports Assumption 3. Further, it is clear that y = 0.8 belongs to the set Σ 1 = (0.29, 0.83) (see Table 4 in the Appendix). Hence the conditions for Proposition 1 are satisfied. So we can expect bribe inducement to be optimal at all µ 1 at p 1 = 1/2. Table 2 : Bribe inducement range of p 1
In Table 2 we present several values of µ 1 over which bribe inducement is optimal. 18 p 10 is the critical probability at which EΠ BI = EΠ 0 (also = EΠ BP Columns 2-4 of Table 2 give these critical values of p 1 against µ 1 . As can be seen, with successive increases in µ 1 , p 10 declines andp 1 increases; thus, clearly the region of bribe encouragement expands. As p 11 also decreases with µ the region of bribe tolerance contracts. It is also seen that when team 1 is a strong favorite, bribery is not optimal at µ 1 = 0.3. On the other hand, when team 1 is moderately underdog (p 1 slightly greater than p 10 ) not only is bribery optimal, but it gives higher profit than the benchmark case.
More importantly, bribery is always optimal at the perfectly even contest (p 1 = 1/2), a confirmation of Proposition 1. At µ 1 = 0.20 or higher values, we have bribe encouragement at p 1 = 1/2.
Columns 5 and 6 give the percentage of profit gained from bribe inducement, over and above the bribe prevention profit and the benchmark profit respectively, at the perfectly even contest.
We see that these proportions also rise with µ 1 . With µ 1 = 0.9 the profit gains from bribery exceed 100 percent. For Column 6, we should note that the condition for Proposition 2 is met; y = 0.8 ∈ Σ 2 = (0.16, 0.92) (for which see Table 5 in the Appendix).
Figs. 3a, 3b and 3c show the profit curves for three values of µ 1 . The red curve represents profit from bribe inducement and the blue curve profit from bribe prevention. The yellow curve is the expected profit from the 'no IP' case. Three sets of graphs are based on the same parameter values except µ 1 . In Fig. 3a , we assume µ 1 = 0.05, in Fig. 3b , µ 1 = 0.3 and in Fig. 3c µ 1 = 0.7.
18 All the simulation work in the paper has been done in Microsoft Excel. Table 3 : Bribe tolerance range of p 1
As should be obvious, the bribery incentive is concentrated around p 1 = 1/2. When µ 1 is as low as 0.05 (Fig. 3a) , bribe inducement profit actually exceeds the 'no IP' profit between p 1 = 0.245 and p 1 = 0.45. But as µ 1 increases (see Figs. 3b or 3c ) the match-fixing incentive disappears from the higher end of p 1 . The bribing incentives generally increase in moderately uneven contests with team 1 being weak. The even contests remain vulnerable and the payoff from match-fixing around these contests keeps increasing with µ 1 . In fact, higher the value of µ 1 , stronger the incentive to fix the match (around the even contest). This heightened incentive spreads to uneven contests (moving leftward) where team 1 is an underdog. This also confirms our discussion based on Fig. 1 that the bookie's incentive to induce bribery is strongest at p 1 = 1/2.
Example 2. This example is for the case of both teams corruptible. We assume symmetry and consider similar parameter values, λ 1 = λ 2 = 0, Ω 1 = Ω 2 = 0.25 and y = 0.8; but we restrict our
Also verify from Table 6 in the Appendix that y = 0.8 belongs to Σ 3 for any µ ≤ 0.15, given λ = 0. Hence the unconstrained solution will hold for the BI problem. Further, Assumption 4, required for Proposition 3, is also satisfied. How the BI profit varies with successive changes in µ at p 1 = 1/2 (in reference to Proposition 3) is given in Table 3 by simulating the BI and BP profits for a range of µ. We see that EΠ BI is equal to EΠ 0 only at µ = 0. As µ rises, EΠ BI falls (see Column 2 of Table 3 ); but still bribe inducement is preferred at all µ ≤ 0.11, as shown by column 3 of Table 3 .
From Fig. 4 we see that the optimality of bribe inducement holds over the entire interval [0.36, 0.64] at µ = 0.05. At µ = 0.15, no longer is bribery optimal at the perfectly even contest (see Table 3 ). However, contests with p 1 ∈ (0.36, 0.39) and p 1 ∈ (0.61, 0.64) are still suitable for fixing.
These two intervals gradually shrink and disappear at µ > 0.17 (see column 4 in Table 3 ).
If we compare the maximum incidence of match-fixing at the perfectly even contest (p 1 = 1/2) between the two examples, it falls from 1 in Example 1 to 2µ = 0.22 in Example 2. Greater scope of bribery drastically reduces the incidence of bribery. 
More general distribution functions of bettors' beliefs
We now examine whether our analysis of the bookie's incentives is specific to uniform beliefs assumption. One way to do that would be to extend the 'no IP' case to a class of more general distribution functions, and see if the bookie's profit is still minimum around even contests.
Suppose the bettors' beliefs are given by a probability density function g(q) over q ∈ [a, b]
with 0 ≤ a < buy ticket 2. They each have one dollar to bet. Restricting π 1 < b and π 2 < 1 − a for positive sale of tickets, the bookie maximizes the following, subject to (no) Dutch-book, i.e., Assumption 2:
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are:
The second-order conditions are satisfied if the following assumption is made, which also helps to ensure monotonicity of the optimal prices. 19 Assumption 5 The hazard rate
is decreasing, and
It is easy to see that the above assumption will be satisfied by densities symmetric around The following lemma shows that the bookie's problem has a unique interior solution and prices are (weakly) monotonic in p 1 . Moreover, the bookie will never set π 1 below a and π 2 below 1 − b because by raising π 1 up to a and π 2 up to 1 − b, profit can be raised without losing ticket sales.
Lemma 3 (Monotonic prices)
Optimal prices (π 0 1 , π 0 2 ) solving the bookie's problem are unique:
is non-decreasing in p 1 and π 0 2 is non-increasing in p 1 . Further, the 'price markup' on ticket i (i.e. 
19 Second-order conditions are:
The first terms (inclusive of the negative sign) are the derivatives
and
that are negative by Assumption 5. Since π i > p i for positive profit, second-order conditions follow.
Proposition 4 (A class of distribution functions & corruption-free betting) (i) The
bookie's profit EΠ 0 (p 1 ) is (nearly) U-shaped with a unique minimum at p * 1 , which solves k(p 1 ) = 0 in (19).
(ii) Further, if g(q) is symmetric and a + b = 1, then p * 1 = 1/2.
(iii) Suppose g(q) is symmetric. Also assume that at p 1 = a+b 2 , the price markups satisfy
and for a + b < 1, p
(The second assumption in part (iii), i.e. condition (20) , suggests that when team 1 is already a favorite, the price markup on ticket 1 should be smaller than that on ticket 2, reflecting the difficulty of making a profit from a team that has a greater chance to win.)
As an illustration we derive the minimum profit point for 'unbalanced' uniform distribution, which automatically satisfies Assumption 5, the second assumption in part (iii), and conditions (21)- (22) . Optimal prices are
Substituting π 1 = √ bp 1 and π 2 = (1 − a)p 2 into Eq. (19) we obtain the minimum profit point ). The main message of Proposition 4 is that for a symmetric distribution the minimum profit point will diverge from the even contest, only if the support is 'unbalanced' (i.e. a + b = 1). Even then, p * 1 will not stray too far from 1/2, as long as the prices observe some regularity conditions (i.e. (21) or (22)). Therefore, our insight into the bookie's desire to orchestrate fixing at even and near-even contests remains valid for a class of (general) distribution functions.
Partially rational bettors
So far our analysis relied on naive bettors assumption. Here we briefly consider the case of rational bettors. Intuitively, like in markets for financial assets involving noise and sophisticated/informed traders where the latter group benefits at the expense of the former, in our model naive bettors create an environment in which unscrupulous fixers and monopolist bookmaker can implicitly collude or coordinate to the detriment of fair contest and fair betting. It is to be expected that if the market is populated more by rational bettors, the monopolist's hands will be somewhat tied limiting his profitable match-fixing opportunities. We will verify this simple intuition using a plausible description of rational bettors.
There are at least two counts on which the bettors' rationality can be improved. First, bettors may become aware that there is a possibility of match-fixing, and second, they can try to extract information about the teams' winning chances from the posted odds.
If we were to admit rationality only on the first count, then our model can be easily extended by allowing the bettors to revise their q as q[µ 1 λ 1 + (1 − µ 1 )] when only team 1 is corrupt and [µλq + µ(1 − λ(1 − q)) + (1 − 2µ)q] when both teams are corrupt. Bettors may apply this belief regardless of the bookie's strategy. This belief revision will effectively compress the support of the bettors' belief distribution. 20 Then using the insight of Proposition 4 we can tell the bookie's expected profit curve (ignoring his potential loss to the fixer, if any) will certainly be somewhat dampened at very low and very high values of p 1 , but will still have a minimum point at or near p 1 = 1 2 , which suggests that the bookie's match-fixing incentive may weaken, but will not disappear. An alternative would be to allow for rationality on both counts. Admittedly, modeling information extraction from the posted odds is a challenging problem and it is beyond the scope of this paper. In our setting, by observing the bet prices the bettors cannot infer p 1 (even if they know all parameters of the model), simply because they cannot be sure which strategy the bookie is pursuing -bribe prevention or inducement. Therefore, we introduce a simple assumption on the bettors' behavior, which makes the bettors at least partially rational. We assume that the knowledge of the presence of a fixer makes them suspicious of foul play, if they see the posted odds are really 'too far away' from the odds induced by their initial belief. Our assumption is couched as a 'behavioral rule' as follows:
If the market odds are too good to be true, a 'partially rational' bettor would apply extreme caution and may revise his prior q before placing any bets. If the posted prices offer a rate of return in excess of an exogenous threshold R > 0 on a particular ticket, say ticket 1, then the rational bettor reasons that it is too good to be true; team 1 is going to be bribed, and it is wise not to bet on it at all.
Suppose for a bettor with belief q, ticket 1 is a preferred bet: max{
. As long as
≤ R, he sticks to his belief q and bets on team 1. But if
> R, he completely withdraws from betting (i.e. revises q = 0). Similar rule applies for a bettor when ticket 2 is his preferred bet.
There are several justifications for the above strategy. First, in reality, most investors are weary of projects that promise too high a return, when they are conscious of the possibility of foul plays.
In gambling too, betting odds that are 'too good to be true' should make them nervous. It is also 20 In the first case the support is [0, µ 1 λ 1 + (1 − µ 1 )], and in the second case, it is
nearly impossible for the bettors to do sophisticated guesswork and extract precise information from posted odds, due to cognitive limitations, bounded rationality, or just lack of expertise. A simple cut-off strategy can be the most practical way to make decisions in such environments.
Second, though our assumption pertains to a sudden withdrawal from betting, one could al- Third, our behavioral assumption can be seen as an alternative to allowing bettors' beliefs to be correlated with the nature's initial draw (which makes them 'less naive', a point we mentioned in Section 6). Even without such information precision, the bettors may bet conservatively (for other reasons), which in turn can limit the monopolist's hands in inducing match-fixing.
Fourth, the real world betting market is likely to have a mix of both types of bettors -naive and rational (full or partial, whichever way it is defined). The first group, called leisure/amateur bettors, takes a punt of a few dollars on a sport that they love for the enjoyment of gambling In what follows, we will refer to our 'partially rational' bettors simply as 'rational' bettors.
Betting rule for rational bettors. Given the above definition of rationality, a rational bettor bets on team 1 if and only if π 1 ≤ q ≤ π 1 (1 + R), and bets on team 2 if and only if
The above rule implies that there are now two additional groups of bettors who will not bet.
All (rational) bettors with q < 1 − π 2 (1 + R) and q > π 1 (1 + R) will not bet, in addition to bettors with q ∈ (1 − π 2 , π 1 ). That also means under no circumstances, the bookie will be able to induce all bettors to bet in a preferred direction and collect the entire fund y. This is probably an early indication of the difficulty of defrauding a rational bettor.
We now present an analysis of the bookie's problem for the case where both teams are corrupt, and µ i , λ i , and Ω i are symmetric (µ <   1 2 ). The analysis is comparable with Section 4 for p 1 = 1 2 , and for better comparison we will assume that the ordinary bettors are of two types: naive as in previous sections and rational as defined above; ρ proportion of the ordinary bettors is naive and 1 − ρ proportion is rational. Their prior beliefs are 'uniform'.
Given any p 1 (ignoring bribery), the bookie's profit from rational bettors is calculated as:
Note that, the expected profit from the rational bettors becomes independent of p 1 . The expected profit from the naive bettors is unchanged from the previous section(s). Combining all bets (including IP's) we write bookie's aggregate profit and the bribe inducement program as:
where r 1 = q + µ(1 − λ)(1 − 2q) and r 2 = 1 − r 1 . Differentiating EΠ with respect to π i yields:
Since ρ < 1, π i has to be potentially much larger now for an interior optimum. In particular,
consider the special case of ρ = 0 (all bettors are rational). Then the above derivative is strictly positive, and by (2), the bookie should set π 1 = φ 2 and π 2 = φ 1 , yielding match-fixing inducement profits:
On the other hand, in this special case if the bookie were to prevent bribery, his profits would be at least:
Thus, we have the following result:
Proposition 5 (Rational bettors and no match-fixing) When almost all ordinary bettors are rational (i.e. ρ → 0), the monopolist bookie prefers bribe prevention over match-fixing.
With a mix of bettors, match-fixing may be optimal less often than when all bettors are naive.
The above result shows that rational bettors are an obstacle to orchestrating match-fixing.
While the complete elimination of match-fixing result (obtained in the special case) is rather extreme, we should keep in mind that the underlying assumptions are also extreme, such as complete withdrawal from betting, and both teams being corruptible. 21 Also, with all rational bettors, if withdrawal from betting is gradual, then match-fixing is likely to become optimal in some cases.
An additional consideration that we have ignored due to the one-shot nature of the game is the bookie's reputation effect. If match-fixing is uncovered, ordinary bettors would be reluctant to bet 21 Recall, for naive bettors, both teams being corruptible may imply less match-fixing.
in the future. This will work against bribe inducement.
Does Proposition 5 cast a serious doubt on our model of match-fixing? We definitely think not.
In real-life sports betting, markets are likely to have a mix of naive and rational bettors. So long as there are considerable number of naive bettors, who follow the game with their exogenous beliefs and completely unmindful of the dark side of betting, unscrupulous fixers will always have their negative influence.
Enforcement issues and concluding remarks
We have presented a model of monopoly betting with the risk of match-fixing, and shown that the market outcome is vastly different from the competitive case for even contests. The monopolist bookmaker abuses his market power sometimes and encourages match-fixing. But other times, he tolerates match-fixing as more of a survival strategy. The undesirable outcome of course depends on several market microstructure elements, such as the bettors' beliefs, information hierarchy, market concentration and the extent to which fixing can tilt the outcome.
One key element of our analysis is exogenous enforcement. Clearly strategic enforcement would add a particular type of interaction between the bookie and anti-corruption authority. But in light of our present analysis it can be said that even if enforcement is made clever, it would hardly pick an even contest to investigate, because its outcome is 'meant' to go either way. We can also see that in many cases of interest, the optimal odds by the bookie give away whether the bookie is trying to orchestrate match-fixing. Shouldn't then the bookie be prosecuted as well? Particularly when match-fixing is encouraged, he is as much culpable as the match-fixer.
It is also well known, and often discussed in the public media, how bookmakers can tell whether some unusually high wagers or betting activity and even the odds pattern (where odds are generated endogenously as in parimutuel setting) can be the tell-tale sign of fixing (see footnote 7). But then shouldn't the enforcement's investigation policy be accordingly more sophisticated to extract information from market data?
In the real world, there may also be a lack of will, and appropriate regulation and coordination among different agencies. A random report on the internet about football governance by the sport's highest body, FIFA, expresses disappointment in the following These determine the unconstrained optimal prices for the bookie:
the Dutch-book constraint is satisfied, as
Derivation of bribe inducement profit when only team 1 is corruptible. From Eq. (5) we can write the ticket 1 profit as
). From Eq. (6) substitute
e. the constraint on π 1 does not bind), and obtain
when λ * 1 p 1 < p 1 (i.e. the constraint on π 1 does bind), we have
On the other hand, as the IP bets on team 2, ticket 2 profit is
Substituting λ * 1 = µ 1 λ 1 + (1 − µ 1 ) and z = 1 − y in the third term above rewrite it as
From Eq. (6) substitute π 2 = 1 − λ * 1 p 1 + µ 1 (z/y)(1 − λ 1 p 1 ) into the above and obtain
Further, we can simplify 1 − λ * 1 p 1 + µ 1 z y (1 − λ 1 p 1 ) to be p 2 + µ 1 y {p 1 (y − λ 1 ) + 1 − y} and write
Now suppose π 2 is constrained to be φ 1 , then ticket 2 profit is
In order to calculate total profit we need to consider two cases depending on the size of λ 1 .
This is the case presented in Eqs. (9)- (11) . When neither of the two prices are constrained, the total bribe inducement profit is given by the sum of the profit expressions given in Eqs. (23) and (25) as follows:
Substitute p 1 = 1/2, and with some rearrangement of terms obtain Eq. (9), referred as EΠ 1 BI . Next, consider π 1 to be unconstrained and π 2 to be constrained. The total profit is now given by the sum of (23) and (26), which yields
Once again substitute p 1 = p 2 = 1/2 and rearrange terms to obtain EΠ 2 BI as given in Eq. (10). Finally, when both prices are constrained we need to sum up the profits given in Eqs. (24) and (26) to derive the total profit, which is
Set p 1 = 1/2 in the above to obtain EΠ 3 BI in Eq. (11) . This completes the derivation of Eqs. (9)-(11). (1−λ 1 ) < 1 <μ 1 does not apply, because the constraint on π 2 will always bind at some µ 1 (given p 1 = 1/2). Henceμ 1 is always less than 1.
Finally, the case of Lemma A1. If y ∈ Σ 1 , then the profit expression EΠ 2 BI is increasing in µ 1 ∈ (0, 1 2(1−λ 1 ) ] when λ 1 < 1/2, and increasing over the entire interval µ 1 ∈ (0, 1] when λ 1 ≥ 1/2. Also, atμ 1 , EΠ 2 BI > EΠ BP .
Proof of Lemma A1. First note that EΠ 2 BI is the highest BI profit at µ 1 ∈ [μ 1 , min{
BI is also feasible over µ 1 ∈ (0,μ 1 ), because setting π 2 = φ 1 induces bribery at this range of µ 1 ; but the bookie does better by setting π 2 = 1 − λ * 1 p 1 (< φ 1 ). Hence we can check the slope of EΠ 2 BI over its entire feasible range.
Consider EΠ 2 BI as given in Eq. (10) and differentiate with respect to µ 1 :
This derivative is positive if
The right-hand side expression is largest (= 1) when µ 1 → 0. So we try to identify the values of y such that the left-hand side expression is strictly greater than 1. If such values of y are found, then clearly at any µ 1 the above inequality will hold. For that we need
But note that φ 1 is also a function of y (via Ω 1 which depends on z). Let us denote the right-hand side expression as K(y), and write J(y) = y − K(y).
Higher y means lower z and higher Ω 1 , which in turn implies lower φ 1 . In particular at y = 0, 0 < K(0) < 1; on the other hand, when y → 1, φ 1 → ∞ and by L'Hospital's theorem 
This restriction is automatically satisfied if y ∈ Σ 1 , because
. Therefore, EΠ 3 BI is also upward-sloping if y ∈ Σ 1 . The case of λ 1 ≥ 1/2 is trivial. Here EΠ 3 BI is not relevant; EΠ 2 BI applies to the whole range of [μ 1 , 1]. As y ∈ Σ 1 guarantees increasing EΠ 2 BI , the claim is true.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. (i)
The proof of this part involves only EΠ 1 BI . Recall, ], π 1 = λ * 1 /2, π 2 = φ 1 (1/2) ;
For µ 1 ∈ ( 1 2(1 − λ 1 )
, 1], π 1 = 1/2, π 2 = φ 1 (1/2) . Proof of Proposition 3. Given p 1 1 < 1 2 < p 0 1 , we have EΠ BP < EΠ 0 . Further, given y ∈ Σ 3 , the unconstrained prices given in Eq. (14) solve the BI problem. The resultant BI profit at p 1 = 1/2 is given by Eq. (15) , while the BP profit is given by Eq. (12) . We have already checked that EΠ U BI is declining in µ, and at µ close to 0, EΠ U BI > EΠ BP . At µ = 1/2 by setting EΠ U BI < EΠ BP and rearranging terms we get 2 2−λz y − z y > 2φ + 1 φ , which is precisely our Assumption 4. Hence, there must exist a unique critical valueμ ∈ (0, 1/2), such that at all µ ≤μ we have EΠ BI ≥ EΠ BP and at all µ >μ we have EΠ BI < EΠ BP . BI is optimal up toμ.
Now recall Eqs. (9)-(11
Simulation of the critical ranges of y -refer Tables 4, 5 and 6.
Proof of Lemma 3. It is obvious that it will never be optimal to set π 1 < a and π 2 < 1 − b. If π 1 is set below a, the expected profit from ticket 1 is y(1 − Next, we consider (weak) monotonicity of prices. We know that each price is constant over at some values of p 1 . Specifically, at p 1 < a we have π 0 1 = a over a range of p 1 , and at p 1 > b we have π 2 = 1 − b over a range of p 1 . But when (π 0 1 , π 0 2 ) is given by Eqs. (17) and (18), strict monotonicity
